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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 880102 CA 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, District Court No. 
67354 
Defendant-Appellant. Category. 14b 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
P l a i n t i f f , by and through her attorney, Ronald R. 
S t a n g e r , hereby s u b m i t s her Brief in a c c o r d a n c e with RCA-24 
( a ) . 
PARTIES (RCA-24 (A) (1)) 
All of the parties are listed in the caption. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS (RCA-24 (a) (4)) 
P l a i n t i f f does not d i s a g r e e that the Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction to hear this domestic matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED (RCA-24 (a) (5)) 
1. Did the Court abuse its disgression in finding 
that there was substantial evidence to amend the existing 
Decree and increase Defendant's obligation for child support. 
1 
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2 . D i d t h e C o u r t a b u s e i t s d i s g r e s s i o n i n 
i n c r e a s i n g t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t f r o m $190.00 t o $390.00 per mon th . 
3. D id t h e Cour t abuse i t s d i s g r e s s i o n and commi t 
e r r o r i n t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e p r o p e r t y owned by 
D e f e n d a n t i n d e t e r m i n i n g h i s c a p a c i t y t o pay such i n c r e a s e a 
c h i l d s u p p o r t . 
4 . D id t h e Cour t err i n not r u l i n g on m a t t e r s not 
r a i s e d i n t h e p l e a d i n g s , n a m e l y , wh i ch p a r t y s h o u l d c l a i m t h e 
m i n o r c h i l d as a t a x e x e m p t i o n and w h e t h e r t h e Decree s h o u l d be 
amended r e g a r d i n g who s h o u l d p r o v i d e t h e h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e f o r 
s u c h rn i n o r c h i 1 d . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC. (RCA-24 (a ) (6 ) 
P l a i n t i f f i s n o t d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h D e f e n d a n t ' s 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f d o c u m e n t s he r e f e r s t o as " C o n t r o l l i n g 
A u t h o r i t i e s " . 
STATEMENT OF CASE (RCA-24 (a ) ( 7 ) ) 
The n a t u r e o f t h i s case i s De fendan t i s c h a l l e n g i n g t h e 
a u t h o r i t y o f t h e l o w e r c o u r t t o make i t s F i n d i n g s o f F a c t ana 
C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law and m o d i f i c a t i o n o f a D e c r e e o f D i v o r c e . 
The b a s i s o f D e f e n d a n t ' s a p p e a l i s t h a t he c h a l l e n g e s 
t h e C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t a m a t e r i a l change o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s has 
o c c u r r e d . 
D e f e n d a n t a l s o c l a i m s t h a t t h e C o u r t a b u s e a i t s 
d i s g r e s s i o n i n i n c r e a s i n g t h e a m o u n t o f c h i l d s u p p o r t . 
9 
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Defendant also urges the Court to require the lower court 
to m a k e F i n d i n g s on the m a t t e r s not r a i s e d in the p l e a d i n g s , 
namely, health insurance and tax exemption. 
The D e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r c h a l l e n g e s the l o w e r court's 
a u t h o r i t y to c o n s i d e r D e f e n d a n t ' s p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y in 
determining child support. 
The Court ruled that such o b j e c t i o n s w e r e w i t h o u t 
merit; thereafter, Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
INITIAL DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS 
P l a i n t i f f filed a C o m p l a i n t on A u g u s t 13, 1984 a s k i n g 
for a d i v o r c e a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t t o g e t h e r w i t h s u p p o r t based 
upon the a l l e g a t i o n that they had lived t o g e t h e r for f o u r t e e n 
(14) months. (R. 1-3) 
P l a i n t i f f s u b s e q u e n t l y filed A f f i d a v i t s w h i c h a l l e g e 
the standard of living she had been accustomed to while she was 
living with Defendant. Such Affidavits show that she had been 
l i v i n g in a h o m e v a l u e d at about T w o H u n d r e d T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s 
($200,000.00); and Plaintiff was informed that Defendant earned 
approximately Seventy T h o u s a n o D o l l a r s ($70,000.00) to N i n e t y 
T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s ( $ 9 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) p e r year. (R. 8 & R. 1 6 ) 
P l a i n t i f f ' s m o n t h l y f i n a n c i a l need to m a i n t a i n such s t a n d a r d 
prior to the birth of the parties' child was One Thousand Four 
Hundred Sixty-Two Dollars ($1,462.00) per month. (R. 15) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
D e f e n d a n t ' s A f f i d a v i t da ted November 30 , 1984 showed a 
net income o f Ten Thousand Seven Hundred S i x t y - O n e D o l l a r s and 
E i g h t y - S i x C e n t s ( $ 1 0 , 7 6 1 . 8 6 ) . D e f e n d a n t d i s a g r e e d w i t h t h e 
Two Hundred Thousand D o l l a r ($200 ,000 .00) e s t i m a t e o f t h e v a l u e 
o f t h e home t h e p a r t i e s w e r e l i v i n g i n ; h o w e v e r , he does n o t 
make an e s t i m a t e o f t h e v a l u e o f such home. (R. 25) 
D e f e n d a n t ' s f i n a n c i a l c a p a c i t y a l s o i n c l u d e d o w n e r s h i p 
i n a c o n t r a c t r e c e i v a b l e i n t h e amoun t o f Ten T h o u s a n d E i g h t 
H u n d r e d N i n e t y - E i g h t D o l l a r s a n d T w e n t y - F i v e C e n t s 
( $ 1 0 , 8 9 8 . 2 5 ) ; c o m p l e t i o n e s c r o w o f N i n e H u n d r e d D o l l a r s 
( $ 9 0 0 . 0 0 ) ; t r u c k a p p r o x i m a t e v a l u e o f F o u r T h o u s a n d F i v e 
H u n d r e d D o l l a r s ( $ 4 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 ) ; c a m p e r a p p r o x i m a t e v a l u e o f Two 
T h o u s a n d Two H u n d r e d F i f t y D o l l a r s ( $ 2 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 ) ; h o r s e t r a i l e r 
a p p r o x i m a t e v a l u e o f One T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s ( $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) ; h o r s e s 
a p p r o x i m a t e v a l u e o f Two T h o u s a n a T h r e e H u n d r e d D o l l a r s 
( $ 2 , 3 0 0 . 0 0 ) ; p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y a p p r o x i m a t e v a l u e o f F o u r 
Thousand F i v e Hundred D o l l a r s ($4 ,500 .00 ) and a boat v a l u e d at 
T w e l v e T h o u s a n d F i v e H u n d r e d D o l l a r s ( $ 1 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 ) . (R. 30) 
The o r i g i n a l d i v o r c e h e a r i n g was h e l d December 1 9 , 
1 9 8 4 . The D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t i n c l u d e t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f such 
d i v o r c e h e a r i n g ; h o w e v e r , t h e r e c o r d shows t h e M i n u t e E n t r y o f 
t h e p r o c e e d i n g s d u r i n g such d i v o r c e . (R. 35 -36 ) 
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A written Decision was signed and filed by the Court on 
December 20, 1984. (R. 38-40). 
The Court si g n e a and filed its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on January 11, 1985. 
(R. 45-47) 
The Court found as follows: 
1. The parties lived together for a period of one 
(1) year plus forty-five (45) days. (R. 46) 
2. Defendant should pay ana discharge all of the 
debts incurred during the period the parties lived together. 
(R. 46) 
3. Defendant should pay to Plaintiff Four Hundred 
Dollars ($400.00) for the use and benefit of her counsel. 
(R.47) 
4. Defendant should pay to Plaintiff alimony in 
the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month 
commencing December 1984. (R. 49) 
The Court filed and signed its Decree of Divorce 
pursuant to such Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 
48-50) 
AMENDED DECREE 
D e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y p r e p a r e d and t h e Cour t s i gned and 
f i l e d an A in e n d e d D e c r e e o f D i v o r c e on May 5 , 1985 t h a t 
i n c r e a s e d t h e amount o f a l i m o n y t o Three Hundred F i f t y D o l l a r s 
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($350.00) per m o n t h p a y a b l e t h r o u g h the m o n t h s of May t h r o u g h 
November of 1985 plus One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) additional 
attorney's fees. At this t i m e , the minor child of the parties 
w a s born and the c a r e , c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l of such child w a s 
a w a r d e d to P l a i n t i f f . The Court o r d e r e d D e f e n d a n t to pay 
P l a i n t i f f One H u n d r e d N i n e t y D o l l a r s ($190.00) per m o n t h for 
child s u p p o r t t o g e t h e r w i t h all m e d i c a l b i l l s i n c u r r e d by 
r e a s o n of the birth of said c h i l d . Such s u p p o r t to P l a i n t i f f 
t o t a l e d Five H u n d r e d Forty D o l l a r s ($540.0 0) per m o n t h . (R. 
53) 
The Court also o r d e r e d that the D e f e n d a n t be r e q u i r e d 
to pay m e d i c a l , d e n t a l , o p t i c a l and o t h e r i n s u r a n c e care 
e x p e n s e s for the child d u r i n g the m i n o r i t y of said child. (R. 
54) 
The record d o e s not s h o w that such F i n d i n g s of Fact and 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law or D e c r e e of D i v o r c e and A m e n d e d D e c r e e of 
Divorce were appealed by either party. 
MODIFICATION PROCEEDINGS 
On June 13, 1 9 8 6 , D e f e n d a n t filed a V e r i f i e d P e t i t i o n 
to Modify the Decree of Divorce to set forth detailed visiting 
r i g h t s. (R. 5 7 ) 
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On J u l y 1 1 , 1986, P l a i n t i f f f i l e d an Answer t o V e r i f i e d 
P e t i t i o n t o M o d i f y D e c r e e o f D i v o r c e and f i l e d a C o u n t e r 
P e t i t i o n . (R. 62) 
P l a i n t i f f a n s w e r e d D e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t f o r s p e c i f i c 
v i s i t a t i o n . (R. 62-63) 
In P l a i n t i f f ' s Coun te r P e t i t i o n t he P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s a 
s u b s t a n t i a l change o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s and f u r t h e r a l l e g e s t h a t 
b e c a u s e o f an i n c r e a s e d need and D e f e n d a n t ' s a b i l i t y t o pay a 
r e a s o n a b l e amount o f c h i l d s u p p o r t , D e f e n d a n t ' s d u t y t o s u p p o r t 
h i s m ino r c h i l d shou ld be i n c r e a s e d t o Four Hundred T w e n t y - F i v e 
D o l l a r s ( $ 4 2 5 . 0 0 ) p e r m o n t h . (R. 64) 
The s p e c i f i c v i s i t a t i o n r e q u e s t e d by D e f e n d a n t and 
o b j e c t e d t o by t h e P l a i n t i f f i s n o t a s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f 
D e f e n d a n t ' s appeal . 
D e f e n d a n t f i l e d an A n s w e r t o P l a i n t i f f ' s C o u n t e r 
P e t i t i o n on J u l y 2 8 , 1986 . (R. 6 7 - 6 9 ) 
On J a n u a r y 6 , 1 9 8 7 t h e C o u r t a n d t h e C o u r t ' s 
C o m m i s s i o n e r o r d e r e d t h a t D e f e n d a n t had t h e r i g h t t o c e r t a i n 
s p e c i f i c v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . 
On Janua ry 15, 1987 P l a i n t i f f f i l e d an O b j e c t i o n and a 
R e q u e s t f o r F u r t h e r H e a r i n g B e f o r e a D i s t r i c t Judge (R. 1 7 8 -
184) I n such O b j e c t i o n , t h e r e w e r e o t h e r m a t t e r s t h a t w e r e 
r a i s e d t h a t are n o t an i s s u e i n t h i s a p p e a l . 
7 
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On J u l y 2 8 , 1987 a h e a r i n g on t h e o b j e c t i o n s and t h e 
i s s u e s r a i s e d by each p a r t y was h e l d b e f o r e Judge B a l l i f . Such 
h e a r i n g l a s t e d t w o (2 ) d a y s . A t r a n s c r i p t o f such h e a r i n g i s 
i n t h e r e c o r d . 
On August 1 1 , 1987 t h e Judge f i l e d a w r i t t e n D e c i s i o n . 
(R. 2 1 4 - 2 1 9 ) 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION PROCEEDINGS 
On S e p t e m b e r 1 4 , 1987 D e f e n d a n t f i l e d O b j e c t i o n s t o 
F i n d i n g s o f F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law and M o t i o n t o Amend 
Judgment . (R. 220-221) De fendan t f i l e d a Memorandum i n Suppo r t 
o f h i s O b j e c t i o n s (R. 222-228) 
On September 23 , 1987 P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a M o t i o n oppos ing 
D e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s and opposed D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o Amend. 
(R. 2 2 9 - 2 3 3 ) 
On S e p t e m b e r 1 8 , 1987 J u d g e B a l l i f f i l e d F i n d i n g s o f 
F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law and a Second Amended D e c r e e o f 
D i v o r c e . (R. 2 3 6 - 2 4 8 ) 
On O c t o b e r 2 , 1987 t h e C o u r t h e a r d o r a l a r g u m e n t s on 
D e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s t o F i n d i n g s o f F a c t ana C o n c l u s i o n s o f 
Law. 
P l a i n t i f f ' s counse l sen t n o t i c e t o D e f e n d a n t ' s counse l 
i n a l e t t e r d a t e d O c t o b e r 2 2 , 1987 e n c l o s i n g such p r o p o s e d 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second Amended 
Decree. (R. 258) 
Objections to the proposed Findings of Fact were filed 
on November 20, 1987 by Defendant. 
DECISION ON MODIFICATION 
After argument, the court took this matter under 
consideration and filed a Ruling on November 23, 1987 which 
overruled Defendant's objections. (R. 261 & R. 276-277) On 
the same date, the Court filed its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Second Amended Decree of Divorce. (R. 
262-271) 
PROCEEDINGS AFTER DECISION 
Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Second Amended Decree of Divorce; 
Objection to proposed Findings of Fact and Second Amended 
Decree and Motion for Clarification of Ruling on January 14, 
1988 (R. 279-280) together with a supporting Memorandum (R. 
282-286) 
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion on January 19, 1988 (R. 
290-296) 
Q 
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The record does not s h o w that D e f e n d a n t ' s counsel 
s t a t e s that he did not r e c e i v e the p r o p o s e d O r d e r m a i l e d to him 
by Plaintiff's counsel on October 22, 1987. (R. 287-288) 
ORDER OF JUDGE BALLIF 
ON DEFENDANT'S O B J E T T T O N S 
On J a n u a r y 12, 1988 the Court filed a signed M i n u t e 
Entry r e s t a t i n g that the R u l i n g of N o v e m b e r 23, 1987 is 
d e f i n i t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n of D e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s . The Court 
further suggested that Defendant apply for relief as provided 
in RCA-4 ( e ) . (R. 278) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
D e f e n d a n t filed a N o t i c e of Appeal on F e b r u a r y 10, 
1988. (R. 276-277) 
REPLY TO THE STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT'S CASE 
D e f e n d a n t did not give a full and c o m p l e t e s t a t e m e n t 
r e g a r d i n g the f a i l u r e to rule on the tax d e d u c t i o n i s s u e . 
D e f e n d a n t did not m a k e a M o t i o n to the trial c o u r t to c o n f o r m 
the pleadings to the "evidence" he claims were tried. 
D e f e n d a n t does not d e n y that he r e c e i v e d the p r o p o s e d 
F i n d i n g s of Fact and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and D e c r e e of D i v o r c e 
from Plaintiff's counsel prior to the documents being submitted 
to the Court for signature. Defendant had ample opportunity to 
c o n t a c t P l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l e i t h e r on the t e l e p h o n e or in 
i n 
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writing to suggest any additions, corrections, etc. 
from Plaintiff's counsel. 
In Defendant's Brief he did not include the fact that he 
has not been p a y i n g such a l i m o n y and has not for a p e r i o d of 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y one (1) y e a r and that t h e r e w a s no r e q u e s t m a d e 
by Defendant's former wife to make such payments. 
D e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t stated that the p a r t i e s w e r e 
m a r r i e d for f o r t y - f i v e (45) d a y s . He left out the fact that 
the record is c l e a r that the p a r t i e s lived t o g e t h e r for a 
period of one (1) year plus the forty-five (45) days. 
Defendant also refers to a sworn statement at the time 
of the o r i g i n a l d i v o r c e t a l k i n g about the m o n t h l y d r a w in the 
a m o u n t of T w o T h o u s a n d T h r e e H u n d r e d F o r t y - N i n e D o l l a r s 
($2,349.00) per month and monthly expenses in the amount of Two 
T h o u s a n d Seven H u n d r e d and Six D o l l a r s and F i f t y - E i g h t C e n t s 
($2,706.58) per m o n t h . H o w e v e r , D e f e n d a n t failed to i n c l u d e 
the f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n of the D e f e n d a n t w h i c h has been 
specifically set forth in Defendant's Brief. 
Defendant also failed to set forth the elements of the 
Court O r d e r w h i c h are s p e c i f i c a l l y set forth in P l a i n t i f f ' s 
Brief. 
At the o r i g i n a l t r i a l , D e f e n d a n t sets forth c e r t a i n 
f i n a n c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h is d e f i n e d as gross i n c o m e ; 
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h o w e v e r , he f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e t h e b u s i n e s s i n c o m e w h i c h was 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y E i g h t y - T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s ( $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) . 
D e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t r e g a r d i n g g ross income f o r 1986 
once a g a i n s t a t e s a f i g u r e d e t e r m i n e d by De fendan t and f a i l s t o 
s t a t e t h e g ross income o f t h e b u s i n e s s w h i c h was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
E i g h t y - T w o Thousand D o l l a r s ( $ 8 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) . 
D e f e n d a n t r e f e r s t o a " n e g a t i v e n e t w o r t h " o f F o r t y -
Two T h o u s a n d F i v e H u n d r e d T h i r t y - F o u r D o l l a r s and T h i r t y - O n e 
C e n t s ( $ 4 2 , 5 3 4 . 3 1 ) . H o w e v e r , he n e g l e c t e d t o s t a t e t h a t such 
f i g u r e d i d not i n c l u d e t h e home t h a t t he p a r t i e s l i v e d i n p l u s 
o t h e r a c c o u n t s r e c e i v a b l e , e t c . t h a t a r e s e t f o r t h w i t h 
p a r t i c u 1 a r i t y i n P1 a i n t i f f ' s B r i e f . 
D e f e n d a n t s t a t e d t h a t he a t t r i b u t e d t h e i n c r e a s e d 
n e g a t i v e net w o r t h t o a s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n o f h i s b u s i n e s s 
i n c o m e when i n f a c t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r e c o r d , t h e r e was ne^er a 
s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n o f h i s b u s i n e s s i ncome . The funds p a i d 
t o t h e CPA b u s i n e s s a r e s e t f o r t h w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y i n 
P l a i n t i f f ' s B r i e f . 
D e f e n d a n t ' s f a c t s s t a t e d t h a t P l a i n t i f f ' s a l l e g e d o r 
c o m b i n e d m o n t h l y U tah Power and L i g h t and M o u n t a i n F u e l 
u t i l i t i e s c o s t One H u n d r e d F i f t y D o l l a r s ( $ 1 5 0 . 0 0 ) pe r mon th 
where as P l a i n t i f f ' s r e t u r n checks i n t r o d u c e d at t h e t r i a l show 
a c o m b i n e d m o n t h l y c o s t o f F i f t y - F o u r D o l l a r s ( $ 5 4 . 0 0 ) p e r 
m o n t h . 
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Defendant failed to include the fact that Plaintiff had 
m o v e d into a h o m e and such e x p e n s e i n c r e a s e d as a r e s u l t of 
such home. Defendant further fails to include any evidence to 
contradict such increased utility bills. 
D e f e n d a n t s t a t e d t h a t t h e c h i l d c a r e c o s t s w e r e 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y N i n e t y D o l l a r s ($90.00) per m o n t h . Once a g a i n , 
Defendant neglected to include that portion of the record that 
indicated that Plaintiff obtained a new babysitter because of 
her e m p l o y m e n t and b e c a u s e of such c h a n g e , the m o n t h l y child 
care costs increased to Three Hundred Twelve Dollars ($312.00) 
per month. Defendant does not set forth any facts nor does the 
record indicate any evidence contrary to Plaintiff's evidence 
of such increase for child care. 
ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The Utah A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , n a m e l y , the Utah S u p r e m e 
Court and the C o u r t of A p p e a l s have c o n s i s t e n t l y set a \/ery 
stringent standard for reviewing trial courts' decisions. 
D e f e n d a n t c i t e s in his B r i e f as a u t h o r i t y for his 
position, Mitchel 1 v. M i t c h e l 1 , 668 P.2d 561 (Utah 1983). The 
D e f e n d a n t is only p a r t i a l l y a c c u r a t e in s t a t i n g the p o s i t i o n 
taken by the Court in the Mitchell case. Defendant states that 
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the c a s e s t a n d s for a p r o c e d u r e for a c o u r t to i n c r e a s e c h i l d 
support including the burden of proving a substantial change of 
ci r c u m s t a n c e s . 
It s h o u l d be noted that the M i t c h e 1 1 c a s e w a s a case 
that primarily dealt with the change of custody. 
T h e M_jrt£_h_e22. C d s e d l c l n o t p r i m a r i l y r u l e on t h e 
question of increased child support; however, it is important 
to note that the Mitchell case did set forth the standard that 
the Appellate Court uses in reviewing trial courts' procedure. 
The trial court is in an advantaged position in dealing 
with witnesses and the parties and only where the trial court's 
a c t i o n w a s so f r a g r a n t l y u n j u s t as to c o n s t i t u t e an a b u s e of 
d i s g r e s s i o n s h o u l d the a p p e l l a t e f o r u m i n t e r p o s e its o w n 
j u d g m e n t f o r t h a t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t . S e e a l s o 
J o r g e n s e n v. J o r g e n se n , 5 5 9 P.2d 5 1 0 , 5 1 2 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; 
Nilson v. Nilson, 652 P.2d 1323 (1982). 
The Defendant also cites as authority for his position 
O w e n v. O w e n , 579 P.2d 9 1 1 , 913 (Utah 1 9 7 8 ) . The Court ruled 
that the trial court did not abuse its disgression in ruling on 
a P e t i t i o n for M o d i f i c a t i o n for a D e c r e e to i n c r e a s e child 
support. The Court ruled that the decision of the trial judge 
will not be d i s t u r b e d u n l e s s it a p p e a r s that the e v i d e n c e so 
preponderates against the trial court's finding that inequity 
or injustice resulted. 
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The c a s e a l s o d i s c u s s e d the i s s u e that a trial c o u r t 
needs to adjudicate in balancing the need of the child support 
together with all other relevant c i r c u m s t a n c e s that need to be 
reviewed in making such d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Plaintiff argues that 
J u d g e Ball if did not a b u s e his d i s g r e s s i o n in t a k i n g into 
consideration the increased income, the purchase of new assets, 
Defendant's assets, his ability to borrow money and all of the 
o t h e r m a t t e r s r a i s e d in P l a i n t i f f ' s B r i e f . The _0_weji c a s e 
s u p p o r t s J u d g e Ball if in i n c l u d i n g all c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the 
parties so that he can make an appropriate ruling. 
The Court also made an observation that even though the 
A p p e l l a t e C o u r t or any p a r t i c u l a r j u s t i c e w o u l d not have 
arrived at the same decision or that another trial judge would 
arrive at a different decision is not the test of the validity 
of the trial court's d e c i s i o n to i n c r e a s e or d e c r e a s e c h i l d 
support. 
The C o u r t w e n t on to s t a t e that the well r e c o g n i z e d 
R u l e w h i c h has been s t a t e d is that due to the a d v a n t a g e d 
p o s i t i o n and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the trial court in such 
domestic m a t t e r s , the Appellate Court will accord some verity 
to the trial j u d g e ' s a c t i o n s and will not d i s t u r b the judge's 
findings nor the d e t e r m i n a t i o n s made thereon, unless it appears 
that the e v i d e n c e p r e p o n d e r a t e s a g a i n s t t h e m so that an 
inequity or injustice have resulted. 
15 
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The Defendant also sets forth a case that he alleges to 
s u p p o r t his p o s i t i o n , n a m e l y , D e V a s v. N o b l e , 369 P.2d 290 
(Utah 1962). A reading of this case will show that it is not a 
domestic relations case, rather, it is an action to set aside a 
Deed on the g r o u n d s of f r a u d . The Court did, h o w e v e r , set 
forth the duty of the Appellate Court in reviewing evidence and 
g i v i n g e^ery i n f e r e n c e that m i g h t be f a i r l y and r e a s o n a b l y 
d r a w n t h e r e f r o m in l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e to P l a i n t i f f 
( R e s p o n d e n t ) . 
R e f u s a l of the trial c o u r t to e i t h e r find or not find 
c e r t a i n f a c t s s h o u l d be s u s t a i n e d if t h e r e is any r e a s o n a b l e 
b a s i s to s u s t a i n such r u l i n g and that the A p p e l l a n t must m e e t 
the b u r d e n of p e r s u a s i o n by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of e v i d e n c e that 
the Court failed in its function. 
The Court f u r t h e r w e n t on to also say that Cue to the 
function of the trial courts, as the person who determines the 
f a c t s and has the a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n in c l o s e p r o x i m i t y to 
witnesses, it is his privilege to be the exclusive judge of the 
c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s and that is the r e a s o n the w e i g h t is 
to be given to the findings of the trial court. 
P a g e 12 of D e f e n d a n t ' s B r i e f c o n t a i n s a p a r t i a l 
s t a t e m e n t m a d e by the D e V a s c a s e , n a m e l y , the trial c o u r t s 
c a n n o t s t u b b o r n l y i g n o r e and r e f u s e to be g u i d e d by c r e d i b l e 
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u n c o n t r a d i c t e d e v i d e n c e . The r e c o r d c l e a r l y s h o w s that the 
e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by the D e f e n d a n t w a s c o n t r a d i c t e d . 
The Defendant also cites Openshaw v. Openshaw, 639 P.2d 
177 (Utah 1981). Once again, the Appellate Court affirmed the 
trial court's d e c i s i o n in this c a s e . The Court once a g a i n , 
stated the stringent rule of appellate review, namely, that the 
trial court's r u l i n g s will not be d i s t u r b e d b e c a u s e of its 
advantaged position unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
to the c o n t r a r y or the trial c o u r t a b u s e s its d i s g r e s s i o n or 
mi sappli es the 1 aw. 
D e f e n d a n t c i t e s the O p e n s h a w c a s e in s u p p o r t that the 
C o u r t m u s t t a k e into c o n s i d e r a t i o n D e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r a l i m o n y 
o b l i g a t i o n . A r e a d i n g of the O p e n s h a w c a s e , h o w e v e r , c l e a r l y 
does not support that concept. Such case states that the trial 
court should consider obligations that have incurred since the 
D i v o r c e D e c r e e . In t h i s m a t t e r , c l e a r l y the o b l i g a t i o n 
referred to by Defendant was prior to the Decree. 
The O p e n s h a w c a s e also a g r e e s w i t h the s t a n d a r d of 
j u d i c i a l r e v i e w that has been set f o r t h by the p r e v i o u s c a s e s 
cited in plaintiff's Brief. 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO MEEET HIS 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
The D e f e n d a n t did not m e e t his b u r d e n of p r o o f as 
r e q u i r e d by t h o s e c a s e s c i t e d by his B r i e f u n d e r the t i t l e of 
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" S t a n d a r d of A p p e l l a t e R e v i e w " . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s Court should 
not rule that the trial court was in error in finding a change 
of circumstances. 
A r e a d i n g of s u b s t a n t i a l l y , if not a l l , of the c a s e s 
cited in D e f e n d a n t ' s B r i e f the trial j u d g e s w e r e u p h e l d in 
t h e i r a e c i s i o n s b e c a u s e they did not m e e t t h e i r b u r d e n of 
proof. 
An e x a m p l e of this o b s e r v a t i o n is the Mi t c h e 1 1 case 
( a l r e a d y c i t e d ) . In that c a s e , the Court found a s u b s t a n t i a l 
change of circumstances even though the father took the child 
c o n t r a r y to the o r d e r of the C o u r t . The Court a f f i r m e d the 
trial court's amendment to the Decree regarding custody because 
A p p e l l a n t f a i l e d in his b u r d e n to s h o w that t h e r e has been an 
abuse of disgression. 
P l a i n t i f f a g r e e s that in o r d e r to a m e n d an e x i s t i n g 
D e c r e e of D i v o r c e , the t h r e s h h o l d q u e s t i o n of a c h a n g e of 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s must be met. Judge Ballif ruled that there had 
been a s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e of c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A r e a d i n g of 
D e f e n d a n t ' s B r i e f m e r e l y r e a r g u e s the s a m e m a t t e r s that he 
a r g u e d at the t h r e e (3) h e a r i n g s that w e r e heard in this 
matter. 
W i t h o u t a t t e m p t i n g to retry the e n t i r e c a s e , a few 
examples should be set forth to show that Judge Ballif did not 
i« 
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a b u s e h i s d i s g r e s s i o n in f i n d i n g a m a t e r i a l c h a n g e of 
circumstances. 
DEFENDANT'S INCREASED INCOME AND 
INCREASED NEED FOR CHILD SUPPORT 
D e f e n d a n t p r e p a r e d all of the d o c u m e n t s that w e r e 
i n t r o d u c e d into c o u r t , he p r e p a r e d the tax r e t u r n s and all 
summaries relating to his finances introduced into court. At 
no t i m e , did D e f e n d a n t e v e r b r i n g in a t h i r d p a r t y to 
c o n f i r m h i s a c c o u n t of h i s o w n f u n d s . D e f e n d a n t m a d e 
charactorizations of his income inconsistent with the standard 
that should be used to d e t e r m i n e the a b i l i t y of a person to pay 
child s u p p o r t , n a m e l y , his gross i n c o m e . D e f e n d a n t used such 
t e r m s as "cash f l o w " , " n e g a t i v e net w o r t h " , etc. All of t h e s e 
t e r m s are a c c o u n t i n g t e r m s and s u b j e c t to m a n i p u l a t i o n and 
interpretation. 
The D e f e n d a n t a t t e m p t s to s h o w , by his own c a l c u l a t e d 
f i g u r e s , a d e c r e a s e of his i n c o m e . Such d e c r e a s e is not only 
i n a c c u r a t e , but is not s u p p o r t e d by the record. The record 
s h o w s that D e f e n d a n t a g r e e d that even the way that he f i g u r e d 
his net i n c o m e ihat it i n c r e a s e d from Ten T h o u s a n d Seven 
Hundred Sixty-One Dollars and Eighty-Six Cents ($10,761.86) (R. 
4 8 4 ) to S e v e n t e e n T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s ($17,000.00) per y e a r . (R. 
468) In 1983, Defendant made Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty-
One D o l l a r s ( $ 1 0 , 7 6 1 . 0 0 ) . (R. 481) 
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The J u d g e had a l l o f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n b e f o r e h im i n 
u s i n g h i s d i s g r e s s i o n i n mak ing h i s d e c i s i o n . 
De fendan t s p e c i f i c a l l y a d m i t t e d t h a t h i s n e t i n c o m e 
i n c r e a s e d f r o m Ten Thousand Seven Hundred S i x t y - O n e D o l l a r s and 
E i g h t y - S i x C e n t s ( $ 1 0 , 7 6 1 . 8 6 ) (R. 481) t o S e v e n t e e n T h o u s a n d 
D o l l a r s ($17 ,000 .00) o r E i g h t e e n T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s ( $ 1 8 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) 
per annum. (R. 484) A l s o , i n 1986 De fendan t earned i n t e r e s t i n 
t h e amount o f Three Thousand E i g h t Hundred F i f t y - N i n e D o l l a r s 
( $ 3 , 8 5 9 . 0 0 ) . (R. 482) The amounts o f i n c r e a s e were i d e n t i f i e d 
as " n e t i n c o m e " . The t r i a l c o u r t was j u s t i f i e d i n u s i n g t h e 
g ross income i n d e t e r m i n i n g c h i l d s u p p o r t . 
D e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n 1 9 8 6 t h a t h i s t o t a l 
d e p o s i t s , w h i c h P l a i n t i f f wou ld argue i s g ross i n c o m e , t h a t was 
d e p o s i t e d i n h i s p e r s o n a l c h e c k i n g accoun t amounted t o E i g h t y -
One Thousand Seven Hundred T h i r t y D o l l a r s and F o r t y - O n e Cents 
( $ 8 1 , 7 3 0 . 4 1 ) - (R. 466 & 5 0 3 - 5 0 4 ) 
Because o f t h e above s t a t e d f a c t s i n t r o d u c e d a t t h e 
v a r i o u s h e a r i n g and t h e f a c t s , law and s t a t u t e s i n P l a i n t i f f ' s 
B r i e f , i t i s P l a i n t i f f ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t 
s u s t a i n h i s p o s i t i o n t h a t J u d g e B a l l i f d i d a b u s e h i s 
d i s g r e s s i o n i n r u l i n g t h a t t h e r e had b e e n a c h a n g e o f 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h a t t h e B r i e f o f De fendan t does not i n d i c a t e 
any m a t t e r s t h a t w o u l d r a i s e t h i s case t o t h e l e v e l w h e r e t h e 
A p p e l l a t e Cou r t s h o u l d o v e r r u l e Judge B a l l i f . 
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A n o t h e r c h a n g e of c i r c u m s t a n c e is that the D e f e n d a n t 
remarried and obtained a wedding ring for his new wife (R. 499) 
The Utah Court of A p p e a l s set forth a p r o c e d u r e for 
changing an existing Decree of Divorce. (Ful1mer v. Ful1mer, 91 
Utah Adv. Rep. 25, filed S e p t e m b e r 16, 1 9 8 8 ) J u d g e B i l l i n g s 
w r o t e the D e c i s i o n . The trial court in that m a t t e r found a 
c h a n g e of c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h s u b s t a n t i a l l y and m a t e r i a l l y 
a f f e c t e d A p p e l l a n t ' s p a r e n t i n g a b i l i t y and w h i c h j u s t i f i e d 
r e o p e n i n g the c u s t o d y i s s u e . Even t h o u g h the main t h r u s t of 
the Ful 1 m e r case w a s a q u e s t i o n of c u s t o d y , it set forth the 
s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w , n a m e l y , that the trial court's d e c i s i o n 
w i l l not be d i s t u r b e d a b s e n t of s h o w i n g of an a b u s e of 
d i s g r e s s i o n or m a n i f e s t u n j u s t i c e . T h e C o u r t q u o t e d 
K r a m e r v. K r a m e r , 7 3 8 P.2d 6 2 4 , 6 2 8 ( U t a h 1 9 8 7 ) ; 
Fontenot v.Fontenot, 714 P.2d 1131, 1132-33 (Utah 1986). 
P l a i n t i f f a g r e e s w i t h the p r o c e d u r e of a t w o - s t e p 
b i f r u c a t e d p r o c e s s w h e n a m e n d i n g a D e c r e e . F i r s t , the Court 
m u s t c o n s i d e r if t h e r e has been a s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e in the 
custodial parent's circumstances justifying a re-examination of 
the p r i o r c u s t o d y a w a r d . If that t h r e s h o l d q u e s t i o n is m e t , 
then the moving party is then allowed to proceed further with 
his or her c a s e . 
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A r e a d i n g of D e f e n d a n t ' s B r i e f c l e a r l y s h o w s that 
Defendant does not challenge that the two-step process was in 
fact followed. Defendant merely challenges the grounds or the 
r e a s o n s that the Court found to be s u f f i c i e n t to meet the 
substantial change of circumstance test. 
On page 9 of D e f e n d a n t ' s B r i e f , he m a k e s a point that 
Plaintiff failed to present any documentary evidence in court 
at the t i m e of trial and t h e r e f o r e , m a k i n g her t e s t i m o n y 
s u s p e c t . D e f e n d a n t does not set forth any a u t h o r i t y for such 
c o n c l u s i o n . Oral t e s t i m o n y is proof and the Court has the 
d i s g r e s s i o n to e i t h e r b e l i e v e or d i s b e l i e v e both oral and 
w r i t t e n e v i d e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , D e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n is w i t h o u t 
merit. 
On page 11 of Defendant's Brief, he makes the statement 
that t h e r e is no c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g a d d i t i o n a l 
financial needs for the child. Credibility is a matter that is 
left to the sound d i s g r e s s i o n of the trial j u d g e . D e f e n d a n t 
f a i l e d to i n c l u d e in his p r o p o r t e d f a c t s t h o s e m a t t e r s in the 
record that did s h o w i n c r e a s e d f i n a n c i a l need i n c l u d i n g , but 
not l i m i t e d to an i n c r e a s e in u t i l i t i e s , c h i l d s u p p o r t , car 
p a y m e n t in the a m o u n t of T w o H u n d r e d T h i r t y - S e v e n D o l l a r s 
($237.00) (R. 4 5 5 ) , loan payment and the elimination of alimony 
w h i c h has been r e f e r r e d to in P l a i n t i f f ' s B r i e f and cited to 
the record. 
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Another example of Plaintiff's increased need was that 
the previous Financial Declaration filed by Plaintiff showed a 
need of T w o Hundred Fifty D o l l a r s ($250.00) per m o n t h . That 
i n c r e a s e d to T h r e e H u n d r e d T w e n t y - F i v e D o l l a r s ($325.00) per 
month. (R. 455) 
D e f e n d a n t did not put on any e v i d e n c e to c o u n t e r such 
increase. 
The record f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e s that the child care 
i n c r e a s e d from E i g h t y - F i v e D o l l a r s to N i n e t y - T w o D o l l a r s 
(92.00) per month to Three Hundred and Twelve Dollars ($312.00) 
per month. (R. 457) 
Defendant offered no evidence to show that such amount 
was not accurate. 
P l a i n t i f f also o b t a i n e d a credit union loan in the 
a m o u n t of N i n e t y - F o u r D o l l a r s ($94.00) to pay for the 1978 
truck that "blew up". (R. 4 6 0 ) 
A n o t h e r a d d i t i o n a l e x p e n s e was T h i r t y - F i v e D o l l a r s 
($35.00) per month for a protection bank card. (R. 460) 
All of t h e s e i n c r e a s e s in need i n c u r r e d s u b s e q u e n t to 
the divorce. (R. 461) 
D e f e n d a n t testified regarding his business as follows: 
Q. Are you in business for yourself? 
A. Yes 
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Q. And this is your business? 
A. Yes. 
Defendant admitted that the exact figure of funds that 
were paid to his business in 1986 is Eighty-One Thousand Seven 
Hundred Thirty Dollars and Forty-One Cents ($81,730.41). 
In 1986 Defendant testified that his total deposits in 
his personal checking account were Eighty-One Thousand Seven 
Hundred Thirty Dollars and Forty-One Cents ($81,7 30.41). (R. 
503-504) 
Defendant further testified as follows: 
Q. And the $81,730.00 most of those monies came from 
the generation of revenues of the business. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
The Defendant mixed his income from what he terms as 
personal and business accounts. For example, he testified that 
he paid business expenses out of his personal checking account 
rather than the CPA office account. (R. 505) 
Defendant further testified as follows: 
Q. Now after you deduct those, then what is your total 
income per this statement here? 
A. $81,400.98. (R. 506) 
D e f e n d a n t a g r e e s t h a t i t i s h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o pay h i s 
c h i l d s u p p o r t f i r s t and t h a t such o b l i g a t i o n i s p r o b a b l y t h e 
most i m p o r t a n t o b l i g a t i o n t h a t De fendan t has. (R. 510-511) 
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T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d t h a t w h e n a p a r t y o w n s a 
b u s i n e s s and has the d i s g r e s s i o n of m i n g l i n g p e r s o n a l and 
business finances, the Court may consider both the individual 
income and the business income in consideration of a Petition 
for Modification for child support. 
(Christiansen v.Christiansen, 667 P.2d 529 (Utah 1983)) 
D e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d that he is not p a y i n g any a l i m o n y 
at the time of the hearing to his previous wife. (R. 511-512) 
D e f e n d a n t s p e c i f i e d that he haa paid, in 1986 T h r e e 
T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s ($3,0 0 0.00) in cash for e n t e r t a i n m e n t . (R. 
514) 
D e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d that he m a d e d e p o s i t s into the 
personal account and the business account totaling One Hundred 
S i x t y T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s ( $ 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) . W h e n a s k e d t h a t 
q u e s t i o n , D e f e n d a n t ' s a n s w e r was " Y e s , of the g r o s s d e p o s i t s , 
yes." (R. 5 1 6 ) The D e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d that t h e r e have been 
checks that went back and forth between the two (2) accounts. 
Defendant further testified that disbursement of funds 
from the b u s i n e s s a c c o u n t , H. S h e r w o o d and C o m p a n y , w a s u n d e r 
his supervision and instruction. (R. 516) 
T h e r e c o r d s h o w s t h a t t h e i n t e r c h a n g e b e t w e e n 
Plaintiff's attorney and Defendant regarding proposed Exhibit 
#14 is as follows: 
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Q. L e t me hand you w h a t has been m a r k e d a p r o p o s e d 
E x h i b i t No. 14 . I s t h a t t h e same accoun t? 
A. Yes, i t i s . 
Q. Let m e ask y o u o n e q u e s t i o n n o w , I h a v e g o n e 
t h r o u g h that a c c o u n t and I wa n t to see if you d i s a g r e e with 
this* T h e r e are cash c h e c k s m a d e out to cash that exceed 
$5,000.00. 
A. Right. 
D e f e n d a n t w e n t on to state that such cash was p a y m e n t 
for gas, oil, repairs, entertainment and travel. (R. 471) 
D e f e n d a n t was asked about v a r i o u s c h e c k s m a d e out to 
Nino's and Defendant responded as follows: 
A. They are a p r i v a t e club that you can have d i n n e r 
there or dinner and dance. 
Q. Would there be entertainment also? 
A. Entertainment, personal entertainment. 
Q. So you pay by cash and checks? 
A. Correct. (R. 472) 
D e f e n d a n t ' s c a p a c i t y i n c r e a s e d in 1986 b e c a u s e he w a s 
repaid a loan in the a m o u n t of Seven T h o u s a n d Five H u n d r e d 
D o l l a r s ( $ 7 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 ) . Such f u n d s w e r e d e p o s i t e d in a c c o u n t s 
that were subject to his full control. 
Defendant testified he purchased a new BMW automobile 
that was purchased on December 9, 1986 in the amount of Twenty-
26 
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One Thousand F i ve Hundred D o l l a r s ( $21 ,500 .00 ) . Defendant p a i d 
E i g h t H u n d r e d N i n e t y - E i g h t D o l l a r s ( $ 8 9 8 . 0 0 ) down and F o u r 
Hundred D o l l a r s ($400.00) per month f o r f o u r (4) y e a r s and t hen 
a b a l l o o n payment o f about E leven Thousand D o l l a r s ($11 ,000 .00) 
o r Twe lve Thousand D o l l a r s ( $12 ,000 .00 ) . (R. 477) 
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e b u s i n e s s , D e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e d 
T h i r t e e n Hundred D o l l a r s ($1 ,300 .00) per y e a r on an i n s t a l l m e n t 
s a l e f rom the house t h a t he s o l d i n Amer ican F o r k . (R. 478) 
D e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he has t h e a b i l i t y t o o b t a i n 
an E q u a l i n e Loan f r o m Commerc ia l S e c u r i t y Bank i n t h e amount o f 
F o r t y - N i n e Thousand N i n e H u n d r e d and F i f t y - F o u r D o l l a r s and 
T w e n t y - O n e C e n t s ( $ 4 9 , 9 5 4 . 2 1 ) w h i c h r e p r e s e n t s a l i n e o f 
c r e d i t . (R. 497) 
De fendan t i s mak ing t he r e q u i r e d payments on a l l o f h i s 
o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e p a s t due a l i m o n y due t o 
h i s p r e v i o u s s p o u s e t h a t has a l r e a d y b e e n d i s c u s s e d i n 
P l a i n t i f f ' s B r i e f . 
D e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t as an a c c o u n t a n t t h a t he 
d i d n ' t keep a copy o f t h e f i n a n c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t he 
f u r n i s h e d t o t h e l e n d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n t o o b t a i n t h e E q u a l i n e 
l i n e o f c r e d i t i n t h e a m o u n t o f F i f t y T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s 
( $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) . D e f e n d a n t ' s response was as f o l l o w s : 
Q. As an accountant, you didn't keep a copy of that? 
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A. The only thing I keep is a c l o s i n g s t a t e m e n t . (R. 
518) 
Defendant testified that his income, since the existing 
Decree has about doubled. 
Q. Now its about double that, its about $18,000.00, is 
that right? 
A. Yes. 
D e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d that at the ti me of the 
p r e v i o u s D e c r e e , he w a s p a y i n g P l a i n t i f f the total s u p p o r t of 
Five Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($550.00) roughly. 
A. Correct. (R. 519) 
Such a m o u n t w a s a combi n a t i o n of ali rn ony ana child 
support. (R. 520) 
Defendant further testified as follows: 
Q. And at the p r e s e n t t i m e , as I u n d e r s t a n d it, you 
are making over $18,000.00. 
A. Right. 
Q. You are now paying Sylvia $200.00 
A. Correct. 
Defendant testified that he is currently remarried and 
t h a t h i s w i f e is e m p l o y e d and in 1 9 8 6 s h e w a s e a r n i n g 
approximately Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($6,500.00) and 
that she had graduated from college. 
9ft 
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Defendant further had the ability to buy a wedding ring 
for his current wife in the amount of Six Hundred Nine Dollars 
and Ninety-Eight Cents ( $ 6 0 9 . 9 8 ) . (R. 499) 
D e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r had the funds to go to M e x i c o for his 
honeymoon. (R. 522) 
Defendant further testified that his wife was pregnant 
at the time of the hearing. (R. 521) 
D e f e n d a n t agreed that his credit was good enough to 
obtain a loan for T w e n t y - T w o T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s ($22,000.00) to 
purchase the BMW. 
In addition to the income, Defendant testified that he 
r e c e i v e d T h r e e T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s ($3,000.00) in cash from the 
insurance company when his car was vandalized which went into 
his personal account. (R. 523-524) 
D e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d that for the first six (6) m o n t h s 
that funds in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) 
would be put in his business account. (R. 524) 
In regards to the medical insurance that is available, 
p u r s u a n t to the f o r m e r D e c r e e , D e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d that it is 
not costing him any money. The medical insurance is provided 
under group policy from his father's o f f i c e at no e x p e n s e to 
D e f e n d a n t . (R. 5 2 9 ) S u c h e v i d e n c e is c o n t r a r y to t h e 
allegations made in Defendant's Brief. 
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In r e g a r d s to t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m for i n c o m e , 
D e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y agreed that t h e r e was an i n c r e a s e . He 
stated to the Court as f o l l o w s : "The fact of the m a t t e r is 
that at the t i m e of the d i v o r c e , Mr. S h e r w o o d ' s i n c o m e was 
about $900.00 per month. His 1986 return indicates his income 
to be $1,600.00 per month. That is an increase." (R. 540) 
T h e m i n o r c h i l d of D e f e n d a n t h a s a b a s i c and 
u n a l i e n a b l e right to a r e a s o n a b l e a m o u n t of child s u p p o r t . 
(Reick v. R e i c k , 6 5 2 , P.2d 916) P l a i n t i f f w o u l d argue that 
such right is superior to other claims, including the required 
p a y m e n t of Four Hundred D o l l a r s ($400.00) per m o n t h for the 
Defendant's purchase of a new BMW. 
The Defendant appears to cite Gayle v. Gayle, 579 P.2d 
911 (Utah)) as a u t h o r i t y of his p o s i t i o n . Such case does not 
s u b s t a n t i a t e his p o s i t i o n , quite to the c o n t r a r y , it s u p p o r t s 
the p o s i t i o n of the D i s t r i c t Court J u d g e and the P l a i n t i f f . 
For e x a m p l e , the Court agreed that t h e r e needs to be s h o w n a 
substantial change of circumstances; however, in the Gay!e case 
the Court ruled that at the time of the divorce, the Defendant 
was ill and in the hospital and temporarily off of his job. An 
a w a r d was m a d e based upon his c a p a c i t y to e a r n ; at the h e a r i n g , 
the e v i d e n c e was that t h e r e was no c h a n g e in i n c o m e . 
It was s p e c i f i c a l l y ruled in the G a y l e case that the 
Defendant had the same job at the same rate at the time of the 
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d i v o r c e and at the t i m e of the h e a r i n g , s u b j e c t to a m o d e s t 
increase. 
D e f e n d a n t w o u l d a p p e a r to a r g u e in his B r i e f that the 
only change in the relative position of the parties between the 
d i v o r c e and the h e a r i n g s r e g a r d i n g the P e t i t i o n for c h a n g e is 
the age of the c h i l d . That is not the t e s t i m o n y nor is it the 
sole b a s i s of the P l a i n t i f f as set forth in her B r i e f . The 
trial court took into consideration all of the matters raised 
in Defendant's Brief in making its decision and therefore, the 
decision should be affirmed. 
The D e f e n d a n t also r a i s e s E w e r t v. E v vert, 7 4 4 P. 2 d 
1019 (Utah 1987). The Defendant claims that this is analagous 
to the issue p r e s e n t e d in t h i s c a s e . A r e a d i n g of the case 
does not s u b s t a n t i a t e D e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . Quite to the 
c o n t r a r y , the A p p e l l a t e Court found that the trial court did 
not a b u s e its d i s g r e s s i o n in i n c r e a s i n g the a m o u n t of child 
s u p p o r t to Six H u n d r e d Fifty D o l l a r s ($650.00) based upon a 
g r o s s i n c o m e of t h e D e f e n d a n t of T w o T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s 
($2,000.00). This award was valid even after it was shown that 
she had received substantial gifts, etc. There is no evidence 
in the p r e s e n t case that P l a i n t i f f e v e r r e c e i v e d any great 
inheritance or gifts that would make her more solvent. Quite 
to the c o n t r a r y , the T h r e e H u n d r e d N i n e t y D o l l a r s ($390.00) 
that she w a s a w a r d e d is less than the total s u p p o r t (Five 
O 1 
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H u n d r e d F o r t y D o l l a r s ( $ 5 4 0 . 0 0 ) t h a t was a w a r d e d by t h e Judge 
i n 1983 when De fendan t c l a i m e d t o o n l y ea rn a p p r o x i m a t e l y Ten 
Thousand Seven Hundred S i x t y - O n e D o l l a r s and E i g h t y - S i x Cents 
( $ 1 0 , 7 6 1 . 8 6 ) . I t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t t h e r a t i o 
be tween t h e amount not r e v e r s e d i n t h e E w e r t v. E v v e r t case i s 
n o t d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e amoun t o f s u p p o r t a w a r d e d t o 
P l a i n t i f f i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . 
T h e r e f o r e , P l a i n t i f f wou ld argue t h a t t he E w e r t t case 
i s good a u t h o r i t y f o r P l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p o s i t i o n and does n o t 
s u p p o r t D e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . 
I n c h a l l e n g i n g t h e a m o u n t o f a w a r d and t h e abuse o f t h e 
C o u r t i n m a k i n g t h a t a w a r d , t h e D e f e n d a n t c i t e s t h e 
K e s s i m a k i s v. K e s s i m a k i s , 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1979) . Such case 
i s a l s o s u p p o r t i v e o f t h e P l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n , n a m e l y , t h a t 
t h e A p p e l l a t e C o u r t a f f i r m e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n . The 
a p p e a l was i n r e g a r d s t o a M o t i o n t o Se t A s i d e a D e f a u l t 
J u d g m e n t and t h a t was d e n i e d . The C o u r t d i d comment on t h e 
f i n d i n g t h a t t h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e o f t h e i n c o m e b e t w e e n t h e 
P l a i n t i f f and t h e De fendan t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i v o r c e and t h e 
t i m e o f t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n h e a r i n g was t h a t he d i d not r a i s e any 
q u a i l and t h a t h i s wages were a l i t t l e h i g h e r t h a n l a s t y e a r . 
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In the reading of all of the rest of the cases cited by 
D e f e n d a n t , none of t h e m s u p p o r t his p o s i t i o n , q u i t e to the 
contrary, they support the position of the Plaintiff. 
One last e x a m p l e , the M c B r o o m v. M c B r o o m , 3 84 P. 2 d 
961, 962 (Utah 1983). Plaintiff would argue that such case is 
a l s o s u p p o r t i v e of h e r p o s i t i o n a n d d o e s not s u p p o r t 
D e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . The c a s e m a k e s a yery valid point that 
in r u l i n g on each c a s e as to w h e t h e r t h e r e w a s an a b u s e of 
disgression, such unjustice or abuse must of necessity depend 
on the f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s in each p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , (the 
cases cited - o m i t t e d ) (Emphasis added) 
P l a i n t i f f a r g u e s that it is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the law 
set down by the Utah Appellate Courts which state that a child 
has the a p p r o x i m a t e equal need w i t h the child that he is 
p r e s e n t l y h a v i n g w i t h t h i s c u r r e n t w i f e and that he s h o u l d be 
held in the s a m e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g and s u p p o r t should be 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y equal to the need and w h e n p o s s i b l e , give the 
c h i l d the s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g c o m p a r a b l e to that w h i c h they 
w o u l d e x p e r i e n c e if no d i v o r c e w o u l d h a v e o c c u r r e d . 
(Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133) 
Reference is hereby made to page 4 and 5 of Plaintiff's 
B r i e f s e t t i n g forth the f i n a n c i a l c a p a c i t y and the f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n of D e f e n d a n t at the t i m e of the d i v o r c e . 
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P l a i n t i f f w o u l d a r g u e that the r e c o r d does not show 
that any of the real or personal property has been required to 
be sold to s u s t a i n D e f e n d a n t ' s s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g to pay or 
r e l i e v e d e b t s , etc. To the c o n t r a r y , t h e r e is n o t h i n g in the 
record that s h o w s that he is b e h i n d on his p a y m e n t s to any 
person to the extent that he is being forced to court, included 
in a foreclosure, etc. 
The Court not only did not a b u s e its d i s g r e s s i o n in 
t h i s m a t t e r , but c o m p l i e d w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Utah 
Courts and the Court complied with such standard. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently noted that the 
trial j u d g e haa the e c o n o m i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s of both p a r t i e s and 
the n e e d s of the o f f s p r i n g b e f o r e him w h e n he m a d e his R u l i n g . 
(Hansen v. H a n s e n , 736 P.2d 1 0 2 3 ) This i n f o r m a t i o n was in 
existence in this case. 
T h e C o u r t m a y f a s h i o n s u c h e q u i t a b l e o r d e r s in 
r e l a t i o n s h i p to c h i l d r e n and t h e i r s u p p o r t as r e a s o n a b l e and 
necessary considering not only the needs of the children but also 
the a b i l i t y of the p a r e n t to pay. ( W o o d w a r d v. W o o d w a r d , 709 
P. 2d 3 9 3 ) 
J u d g e Ball if c o r r e c t l y ruled on t h e s e m a t t e r s by 
stating as follows: "But I think when you look at the total of 
what is c o m i n g in from a s t a n d p o i n t of i n c o m e and from the 
s t a n d p o i n t of c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s and all of t h o s e t h i n g s , I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t h i n k a l l o f t h o s e t h i n g s have t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g 
w h e t h e r t h e r e has been a m a t e r i a l change o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s and 
t h a t ' s w h a t has j u m p e d o u t a t me i n t h i s c a s e . " (R. 575) 
The r e c o r d c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e C o u r t d i d n o t 
abuse i t s d i s g r e s s i o n i n t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t he p r o p e r t y 
owned by D e f e n d a n t i n d e t e r m i n i n g h i s c a p a c i t y t o pay such 
i n c r e a s e d c h i l d s u p p o r t . As n o t e d i n P l a i n t i f f ' s B r i e f , t h e 
g o a l o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s t o e q u i t a b l y p u t a l l p a r t i e s , i n 
t h i s c a s e , t h e c h i l d , i n t h e same p o s i t i o n f i n a n c i a l l y as i f 
t h e r e had not been a d i v o r c e . Th i s m a t t e r has been c i t e d w i t h 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y i n P l a i n t i f f ' s B r i e f . I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t i f 
t h e r e had not been a d i v o r c e , t h e c h i l d wou ld have been l i v i n g 
i n t h e house t h a t t h e p a r t i e s l i v e d i n d u r i n g t h e i r - m a r r i a g e 
and w o u l d have had t h e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e a b i l i t y o f D e f e n d a n t t o 
o b t a i n funds f r o m h i s employment c r e d i t or any o t h e r manner as 
se t f o r t h i n t h e r e c o r d . 
The C o u r t has t h e d u t y t o l o o k a t a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s and 
not t o e l i m i n a t e s a i d f a c t s as argued by D e f e n d a n t . 
No cases c i t e d by t h e Defendan t s u b s t a n t i a t e h i s t h e o r y 
t h a t t h e C o u r t s h o u l d be b l i n d as t o t h e t o t a l e x i s t i n g 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f a l l p a r t i e s i n c l u d i n g D e f e n d a n t ' s o w n e r s h i p o f 
p r o p e r t y , e t c . 
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On page 18 of Defendant's Brief, Plaintiff would argue 
that Defendant took a quotation of Judge Ballif out of context. 
The following is the entire quotation from Judge Ballif: "His 
(Defendant's) lifestyle is on the up-swing, and has been. And 
I think that's an i m p o r t a n t i s s u e . I grant y o u , this is not a 
r u n - o f - t h e - m i l l c a s e , and I don't t h i n k there's any a u t h o r i t y 
for t h i s kind of c o n c l u s i o n that I c a m e to w h e n I heard t h i s 
e v i d e n c e . But I t h i n k it is s o m e t h i n g that in e q u i t y , in 
f a i r n e s s and an o b l i g a t i o n to a child w o u l d d i c t a t e be looked 
at c a r e f u l l y and be s c r u t i n i z e d f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t of 
justifying a change in child support." (R. 557) 
T h e C o u r t goes on to say: "I have m a d e it c l e a r that 
the l i a b i l i t y side is going up in my D e c i s i o n . I don't think 
t h e r e is any q u e s t i o n about t h a t . I'm t a l k i n g about w h a t the 
s t y l e of l i v i n g is that the man has. It is going up w i t h the 
debt that is going up, t o o . And that's r e a l l y the e s s e n c e of 
the case." (R. 557-558) 
The C o u r t f u r t h e r s t a t e d : "I have c o n s i d e r e d this 
m a t t e r \/ery d e e p l y and w i t h a high d e g r e e of s e r i o u s n e s s , Mr. 
De J o n g e , and I heard y o u r a r g u m e n t s and you w e r e r e a l l y 
e l o q u e n t and p e r s u a s s i v e , and you're a fine l a w y e r , and you 
represented your client's position very w e l l . 
So I t h i n k y o u r s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i o n to that F i n d i n g 
isn't well t a k e n . I don't t h i n k in it I'm d o i n g w h a t you say. 
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It may be that Ifm doing s o m e t h i n g about not aging a n y t h i n g , 
but I'm not looking at it to age anything. I'm looking at what 
he's doing and what he has in that Finding, (R. 558) 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND 
TAX EXEMPTION 
A r e a d i n g o f t h e r e c o r d , n a m e l y D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n , 
Memorandum and A f f i d a v i t (R. 279-288) t o g e t h e r w i t h r e a d i n g t h e 
e n t i r e r e c o r d shows t h a t De fendan t never made a M o t i o n t o t he 
C o u r t i n w r i t i n g o r i n o p e n c o u r t t o amend D e f e n d a n t ' s 
p l e a d i n g s t o c o n f o r m t o any e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g who shou ld c l a i m 
t h e m i n o r c h i l d as a t a x e x e m p t i o n or who s h o u l d p r o v i d e h e a l t h 
i n s u r a n c e f o r such m i n o r c h i l d . 
The M o t i o n o f D e f e n d a n t s t a t e s i n p a r t as f o l l o w s : 
" F u r t h e r , D e f e n d a n t moves t h e C o u r t f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f i t s 
r u l i n g i n t h a t i t f a i l e d t o r u l e on t h e i s s u e o f a w a r d o f 
i n c o m e t a x e x e m p t i o n and i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o w h i c h o f t h e 
p a r t i e s s h o u l d m a i n t a i n h e a l t h , a c c i d e n t and d e n t a l i n s u r a n c e 
f o r t h e m i n o r c h i l d . " (R. 280) 
A r e a d i n g o f such M o t i o n , t o g e t h e r w i t h t he s u p p o r t i n g 
documen ts , does not c l a i m t h a t a M o t i o n t o amend was ever made 
by t h e D e f e n d a n t . The D e f e n d a n t m e r e l y c r i t i c i z e s t h e C o u r t 
f o r n o t m a k i n g such r u l i n g . The D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t r a i s e such 
c r i t i c i s m u n t i l a f t e r a l l h e a r i n g s had been c o n d u c t e d by t h e 
C o u r t . 
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"(b) (1) M O T I O N S . An a p p l i c a t i o n to the court for an 
o r d e r shall be by m o t i o n w h i c h , u n l e s s m a d e d u r i n g a h e a r i n g or 
trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity 
the grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief or order 
s o u g h t . . ." (Rule 7 (b) U R C P ) N o w h e r e in the record does is 
show that Defendant complied with such Rule. 
A m e r e c r i t i c i s m of the Court for not ruling does not 
take the place of a Motion as described by Rule 7 (b) URCP. 
Rule 15 (b) s t a t e s in part as f o l l o w s : ". . . Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them 
to c o n f o r m to the e v i d e n c e and to raise t h e s e i s s u e s may be 
m a d e upon m o t i o n of any p a r t y at any t i m e , even a f t e r j u d g m e n t ; 
but f a i l u r e so to a m e n d d o e s not affect the result of the trial 
on t h e s e i s s u e s . . ." The Rule f u r t h e r i n c l u d e s in part ". . . 
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended. . ." 
The record fails to show that the mention of insurance 
and tax e x e m p t i o n raised this m a t t e r to the level that w o u l d 
c o m p l y w i t h Rule 15 for e x a m p l e , P l a i n t i f f w a s asked about 
i n s u r a n c e w h e n she w a s r e s p o n d i n g to a q u e s t i o n on o t h e r 
matters. 
When Judge Ballif asked each party what issues were to 
be raised at the oral a r g u m e n t s , at no t i m e did o p p o s i n g 
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The C o u r t o f A p p e a l s e x a m i n e d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f due 
p r o c e s s among o t h e r i t e m s i n Wiscomb v . W i s c o m b , 7 44 P.2d 
1 0 2 4 ; U t a h App . 1 9 8 7 . The C o u r t o f A p p e a l s e x a m i n e d t h e 
Commiss ione r sys tem t h a t was adop ted p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 3 0 - 3 -
4 . 1 - 4 - 4 U t a h Code A n n o t a t e d ( 1 9 8 5 ) . The C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d i n 
t h a t case t h a t due p rocess o f law was v i o l a t e d when one o f t h e 
f u n d a m e n t a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f due p rocess i s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o 
be f u l l y h e a r d . Because De fendan t d i d not r a i s e t h e q u e s t i o n s 
o f i n s u r a n c e f o r t h e m i n o r c h i l a and t h e t a x e x e m p t i o n , t h a t 
due p r o c e s s o f l a w w o u l d be v i o l a t e d by r e q u i r i n g t h e l o w e r 
c o u r t t o make a f i n d i n g on t h o s e i s s u e s when t h e r e was n o t f u l l 
and adequate n o t i c e nor was t h e r e a f u l l and adequate h e a r i n g . 
An e x a m p l e o f how t h e i n s u r a n c e q u e s t i o n came i n i s s e t 
f o r t h i n (R. 461) w h i c h i n t e r c h a n g e i s b e t w e e n D e f e n d a n t ' s 
a t t o r n e y and P l a i n t i f f , name ly , an answer . 
Q. I s n ' t i t a f a c t t h a t Mr . S h e r w o o d has been p a y i n g 
a l l o f t h e c h i l d ' s med i ca l expenses? 
A. That was i n t h e D i v o r c e D e c r e e . 
Q. I s t h a t cove rage a v a i l a b l e f o r her? 
A. Y e s , b u t t h e D i v o r c e D e c r e e s a y s t h a t he i s 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r her and t h a t i s why i t ' s t h a t way. (R. 461 -462 ) 
Q. And i f t h e c a s e w e r e t o come a b o u t and t h a t ' s i n 
f a c t t h e way i t i s , i f Mr . S h e r w o o d d o e s n ' t have i n s u r a n c e , 
wou ld you be w i l l i n g t o put her on y o u r i n s u r a n c e ? 
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of child s u p p o r t from One H u n d r e d N i n e t y D o l l a r s ($190.00) to 
Three Hundred Ninety Dollars ($390.00) per month. 
Defendant further failed to show any case or fact that 
would show that Judge Ballif abused his disgression in taking 
into consideration the complete circumstances of all property 
o w n e d by D e f e n d a n t in d e t e r m i n i n y his c a p a c i t y to pay such 
increased child support. 
The D e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r did not s u c c e e d his b u r d e n to 
show that the Court committed error in not ruling on who should 
c l a i m the child as a tax e x e m p t i o n w h e n such m a t t e r was not 
raised in the pleaaings and no Motion by Defendant was made to 
amend the pleadings to conform to that evidence. 
The original Decree of Divorce required that Defendant 
provide the health insurance for such minor child and because 
t h e r e w a s no M o t i o n or p l e a d i n g s n o r w e r e t h e r e f a c t s 
introduced that would be sufficient to force the trial court to 
m a k e a f i n d i n g on such i n s u r a n c e b e c a u s e such p r o v i s i o n w a s 
i n c l u d e d in the o r i g i n a l D e c r e e and if D e f e n d a n t was r e a l l y 
s e r i o u s about m a k i n g a c h a n g e , he s h o u l d have filed the 
appropriate Petition to amend such Decree. 
. R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h i s 2L/ d d ^  ° ^  
RONALD R. STANGER (#3074) 
Attorney for Respondent 
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